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I. INTRODUCTION

Many residents of nursing homes are frail, with disabling physical problems
and degrees of diminished capacity.' Individuals are typically admitted to nursing
homes because they need either skilled nursing care or nursing care beyond that
available in a less restrictive setting such as an assisted living facility. Many
nursing home residents also require more intense medical care, particularly during
the final stages of life. While competent individuals may make their own health
care decisions, nursing home residents, because of diminished capacity, may be
considered incapable of deciding for themselves.2 Fortunately, existing law allows
individuals to plan in advance for possible future incapacity. All fifty states and the
District of Columbia have statutes authorizing competent adults to make directives
3
in advance for health care decisions.
This article explores issues involving advance directives made by nursing home
residents, both prior to and during their stay in a facility, including the frequency
of making directives, the reasons why residents fail to make directives, and the
reasons why facilities often fail to honor them. Specifically, this article examines
these issues in light of the 1999 California Health Care Decisions Law,4 effective
July 1, 2000, 5 and focuses on how this new statute can be used to empower nursing
home residents, and adults more generally, to take control of decisions regarding
their own health care.

If. HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING IN A NURSING HOME
Few people anticipate spending time in a nursing home. However, the reality
is that a significant portion of the elderly population will spend at least some time
in a nursing home.6 Individuals in need of skilled or recuperative therapy may be
admitted for a temporary stay following their release from a hospital. Individuals
1. Nursing home residents have the following estimated rates of impairment in activities of daily living
(in percentages): eating, 40.3; dressing, 77.6; toileting, 63.2; getting in or out of bed or chair, 62.6; and bathing,
91.0. In addition, 62.6 percent of residents studied were disoriented or had suffered memory loss, and 46.9 percent
had senile dementia or chronic brain syndromes. U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON AGING ET AL., AGING
AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROJEcrIONS 163,167 (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Pub. No. 91-28001, 1991).

2. See, e.g., Eric L. Diamond et al., Decision.Making Ability and Advance Directive Preferences in
Nursing Home Patients and Proxies, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 622, 624 (1989) (study finding that only 19 of 39
patients studied were perceived to be capable of making health care decisions); Jeffrey S. Janosky & Barry N.
Rovner, Prevalence of Advance Directives and Guardianshipin Nursing Home Patients, 6 J. GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY 214, 215 (1993) (finding that only 29 of 233 nursing residents were capable of
making independent decisions regarding health care).
3. For a listing of the statutory provisions, see ALAN MEsELTHE MawT TO DIE §§ 11.22,12.52 (2d ed.
Supp. 1999).
4. 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 658, § 39 (codified at CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4600-4805 (West Supp. 2000)).
5.
l § 43.
6. See Peter Kemper & Christopher M. Murtaugh, Lifetime Use of Nursing Home Care, 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 595 (1991) (study of likelihood those who turned age 65 in 1990 will spend time in nursing home).

734
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entering a nursing home either from their family home or from a facility offering

a level of care lower than that offered in a nursing home normally are admitted
because their current caregivers are no longer able, or in some cases willing, to

provide the needed level of care. For many residents, discharge is not an option; the
nursing home will be their residence for the remainder of their lives.7
A. Dependency and Autonomy in Nursing Homes'

Needless to say, nursing homes are not viewed as desirable places to live. A
nursing home facility is an institution. With institutions come routines, rules and

regulations, and a concomitant loss of autonomy. Although the facility is now the

resident's "home," the resident does not control the routine.8 The loss of control,

whether real or imagined, that occurs upon entering such an undesired environment
may contribute to a decline in a resident's abilities or depression, a common
condition among nursing home residents.9 By encouraging autonomy and

independence, a facility can reduce the sense of loss of control and minimize
resulting depression.10

Resident rights statutes enhance autonomy, individuality, respect and control
for residents. Statutory resident rights include the right to privacy, communications,
visitors, freedom of association, freedom from restraints, confidentiality of records,
accommodation of needs, and participation in activities, as well as confirmation of
the right to refuse treatment and the right to make an advance directive. In addition,

resident rights statutes require that the facility comply with the Patient SelfDetermination Act." A facility which implements resident rights and whose
7.
Close to two-thirds of all nursing home stays terminate by reason of death. Denise A. Spence & Joshua
M. Wiener, Nursing Home Length of Stay Patterns:Results from the 1985 National Nursing Home Survey, 30
GERONTOLOGIST 16, 18-19 (1990). Over 1.5 million people reside in nursing homes in the U.S., with a majority
either dying in the nursing home or within a short time of being transferred to a hospital. Steven C. Zweig,
CardiopulmonaryResuscitationand Do-Not-Resuscitate Ordersin the Nursing Home, 6 ARCHIVES FAMILY MED.
424,424 (1997).
8. See Mary Marmoll Jirovec & Betty A. Maxwell, Nursing Home Residents' FunctionalAbility and
Perceptions of Choice, J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING, Sept. 1993, at 10, 13 (describing the expectation that
residents will be submissive, similar to patients in hospitals, and concluding that medical model is inappropriate
if a facility is truly to become the resident's home); Linda A. O'Brien et al., Nursing Home Residents' Preferences
for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 274 JAMA 1775, 1779 (1995) (noting that many residents believe that their
position as residents compels them to give up their decision-making powers).
9. See, e.g., Barry W. Rovner et al., Depressionand Mortalityin Nursing Homes, 265 JAMA 993 (1991)
(examining the prevalence of depression in nursing home residents).
10. For example, in one study, new residents were given different descriptions of their roles in the facility.
To one group, autonomy and independence were emphasized, while to the other group, the focus was on the
facility. The first group reported a higher level of activity, alertness, and general sense of well-being than did the
second group. Ellen J. Langer & Judith Rodin, The Effects of Choice and EnhancedPersonalResponsibilityfor
the Aged: A Field Experiment in an InstitutionalizedSetting, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 191 (1976).
11. For the federal resident rights provisions, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395i-3(c), 1396r(c) (West Supp. 1999);
42 C.F.R. § 483.10 (West 1999) (listing residents' rights). For a discussion of the federal provisions, see David
M. English, The Rights of Nursing Home Patients: A Planner'sGuide, TR. & EST., July 1991, at 28. For the
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operation creates a culture for honoring them will likely have residents who are less
depressed and feel more in control of their lives. Residents who feel more in control
are more likely to create advance directives, and a facility which respects resident
rights, when presented with an advance directive, is more likely to honor it.
B. Health CareDecisions and "Advance Directives"
At no time is autonomy and control more vividly demonstrated than when a
person must make a decision about health care. Making choices regarding one's
health is a distinctly personal issue that has major ramifications for the
individual-not only in terms of how long the individual will live, but also in terms
of the quality of that individual's life. Because people entering a nursing home may
have significant infirmities and be near the end of their lives,12 they are a group
whose need for advance directives is paramount. The odds are much greater that
critical health care issues will arise for nursing home residents than for "wellelders" living in the community. Further, because of their infirmities, nursing home
residents on average are less 3likely to have the capacity to make a health care
1
decision when one is needed.
1. The Lack of Advance DirectivesAmong Nursing Home Residents
Despite the "ease" with which an advance directive can be made, studies show
that only ten to twenty-five percent of adult Americans have made a directive, 4 and
one study has pegged the number even lower.15 While the percentage of nursing
home residents who have advance directives is higher than non-nursing home
residents, 6 the percentage is still less than a majority.

California resident rights provisions, see CAL CODE REGS. tit. 22, §§ 72527, 73523, 87572.
12. See supranote 1 (listing rates of physical and mental infirmity among nursing home residents).
13. See L. Jaime Fitten et a].,
Assessing Treatmeht Decision-Making Capacity in Elderly Nursing Home
Residents, 38 J. AM. GERIATRIcSOc'y 1097, 1097 (1990) (concluding that frail and dependent elderly individuals

are not only more likely to be asked to make crucial health care decisions, but are also more likely to have
diminished capacity for decision making).
14. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION
ACT-PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 8 (1995)

[hereinafter "GAO Report"] (reporting the results of the implementation of advance directives under the PSDA);
see also Don Colburn, FacingDeathwith a Plan,WASH. PosT, Oct. 27, 1998 (Health Section), at 7 (noting a 1991
Gallup Poll that found that while 75% of Americans support the concept, only 20% of Americans have a living
will).
15. See Susan M. Rubin et al., Increasingthe Completion of the DurablePower of Attorney for Health
Care:A Randomized, Controlled Trial,271 JAMA 209,211 (1994) (noting that only 5.8% of those surveyed had
completed a written advance directive).
16. See, e.g., Melissa D. Zwahr et aL., Implementation and Impact of the PatientSetf.Determination Act:
A Comparison of Nursing Homes to Hospitals, 16 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY 190,203 (1997) (survey reporting
that advance directives were executed by a higher percentage of Georgia nursing home residents than hospital
patients).
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There are numerous causes for this failure to plan and to make advance

7
directives. Some individuals simply choose not to face their own mortality. Others
think their family members, including their spouse or children, will know what to

do "when the time comes," because "they know what I want." However, family
8
members frequently do not know what the spouse, parent or other relative wants;

many19 residents have never discussed with their families the topic of end-of-life
care.

Medical professionals also share responsibility for the lack of advance
directives. Medical professionals routinely do not discuss decisions to be made with
respect to life-prolonging care with nursing home residents. 20 Further, discussions

that do occur frequently are not with the resident directly but with someone close

to the resident, even in the case of residents who have capacity.2' Lack of

communication also occurs with respect to do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. DNR
orders, unlike advance directives such as living wills and powers of attorney, are

in some states signed by the doctor and not by the patient. 22 Also, DNR orders are
sometimes placed in the resident's chart by the doctor without the resident's
knowledge or consent.2 Nursing homes can and should adopt policies and practices

17. See David Orentlicher, The Limitations ofLegislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1272-73 (1994) (noting
natural reluctance to face mortality and unsettling nature of the subject to some people).
18. See Allison B. Seckleret al., Substituted Judgment:HowAccurateAre ProxyPredictors?115 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 92, 92 (1991) (ability of family and physician to predict patient's wishes far lower than patients
believed); Jiska Cohen-Mansfield et al., The Decision to Execute a Durable Powerof Attorney forHealth Care
and Preferences Regarding the Utilization of Life-Sustaining Treatments in Nursing Home Residents, 151
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 289, 291 (1991) (60% of residents surveyed had not discussed their medical care
preferences).
19. See, e.g., O'Brien et al., supra note 8, at 1778 ("For residents able to name a family member or
significant other whom they would want to act as surrogate decision maker in the event they were too ill to speak
on their own behalf, 31% reported having spoken to that individual about treatment preferences.").
20. Explanations for this lack of discussion include;
•
doctors are more comfortable with having, or believe it more appropriate to have, such a discussion
with family members rather than with the patient;
*
doctors believe they know what the patient wants, what is best for the patient, or think that lifesustaining medical treatment is futile;
* some residents may wish not to have a discussion about life-sustaining medical treatment; and
*
residents may not accurately remember whether their doctors talked to them about end-of-life care or
may not have understood that the discussion's outcome led to a decision on end-of-life care.
Jennifer R.Levin et al., Life-Sustaining Treatment Decisionsfor Nursing Home Residents: Who Discusses, Who
Decidesand What is Decided?, 47 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 82, 85 (1999).

21. See Elizabeth Bradley et al., Assessing Capacity to Participatein DiscussionsofAdvance Directives
in Nursing Homes: Findingsfrom a Study of the PatientSelf-DeterminationAct, 45 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 79,
81 (1997) (study of nursing home admissions finding that in a majority of cases advance directive information
is given to someone other than the resident even when the resident is judged to be oriented and alert).
22. For an analysis of the state statutes, see MEISEL, supranote 3, §§ 9.07-9.30 (2d ed. 1995).
23. See, e.g., Levin et al., supranote 20, at 82 (finding that nearly half of residents with DNR orders had
not discussed CPR with caregivers).
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that encourage doctors to consult residents about DNR orders and other end-of-life
decisions. 24
2. Statutory Law and the Use of Form Directives

The federal Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA)25 was enacted in 1990 with
the specific purpose of overcoming the reluctance to make advance directives. The

Act requires facilities receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding to ask residents,
at the time of admission, whether they have an advance directive, to document in
the chart whether the resident has a directive, and if the resident does not have a

directive, to ask the resident if the resident would like one.26 For residents
expressing an interest in having a directive, the facility will normally provide the
resident with a form to complete, either its own or the state's statutory form (use of

which is usually optional).27 Although the Act requires facilities to inform residents
of their rights, the law does not require that the resident actually understand the
information provided. Experience to date suggests that patient understanding of the

meaning of form directives may be superficial at bestl
Many form directives are not easy to understand or read.2 9 In addition,

standardized forms oftentimes focus more on such matters as naming an agent,
giving general directions or, above all, limiting liability to those honoring the
directive, rather than on emphasizing and accurately and precisely reflecting the

wishes of the patient in the given circumstance. Despite this limitation, however,
the making of an advance directive remains the best method for residents to make
their wishes known and to put plans in place to maximize the chance their wishes
will be followed.

24. Id. at 86.
25. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-1 15 to -117,1388-204 to -206 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
26. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w) (West Supp. 1999).
27. Fora discussion of the statutory forms in effect in various states, see David M. English, The UPC and
the New Durable Powers, 27 REAL PROP. PRoB. & TR. J. 333, 368-404 (1992).
28. See Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History and
Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 249, 270-71 (1997) (discussing
studies of effect of PSDA on patient awareness and understanding of advance directives); Thaddeus Mason Pope,
The Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient Self.
Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX: J. LAw-MED. 139, 160-61 (1999) (PSDA not effective in making
individuals aware of legal rights).

29. The need for easily understandable language is not limited to advance directives, but applies to all
documents relating to medical treatment. A study of health care decision making at the Veterans Adminstration
found that itis important to explain the medical treatment proposed in simple language. See Fitten, supra note 13,
at 1102-03. The study found the VA's consent form to be complex, and likely to result in misunderstandings.
"Accurate but simplified disclosures" of the information needed for consent would have benefitted the patient's
understanding much more than the "currently popular legally and bureaucratically inspired forms." Id. at 1103.
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3. Difficulties in Determining Capacity and Implementing Directives
Ideally, a resident should make a directive well in advance of admission to a

nursing home. A resident admitted with significant cognitive impairments may lack
legal capacity to execute a directive or to otherwise make a health care decision.30

Errors are frequently made in determining whether a resident has the requisite
capacity. Although numerous tests are available to determine capacity, the tests that
are easiest to apply are often cursory and may lead to erroneous results. Those that

are more accurate may be too unwieldy for routine use. There is currently no one
method for measuring the capacity of nursing home residents that is used

consistently and provides uniform results.31
The making of an advance directive is no guarantee that the resident's wishes
will be followed. Despite the federal law intended to facilitate the making and
enforcement of advance directives, 32 health care providers are frequently unaware
that a directive exists.33 A resident may have executed a directive prior to admission

to the nursing home, but at the time of admission be unable to tell the facility about
the directive. If the directive was not drawn by a lawyer but prepared from a "do-it-

yourself' kit, no one other than the resident may have a copy of the directive or
even know of its existence. To increase the chance their wishes will be followed,
residents should notify others, especially their health care providers and emergency
contacts, of the directive's existence and location.
The practices of health care providers also contribute to this failure to discover
and implement directives. The directive, once given to the facility, may not be easy
to locate, or even be contained in the medical chart. Thus, the directive frequently
does not accompany the resident upon the resident's admission to a hospital or in
a move to another facility. 34

30. For the rates of impairment, see supra note 1.
31. See Fitten, supra note 13, at 1097, 1103. The authors note that no generally accepted method exists
for assessing a patient's ability to make decisions. As a result, clinicians usually use more informal methods to
make capacity determinations-for example, an abbreviated mental status exam-or may even rely on their own
impressions or those of the staff to decide whether the patient is competent to make a health care decision. Il at
1097. The study concludes that the more informal methods have minimal practical value in determining which
nursing home residents had diminished decision making ability. These simplified "tests" were better predictors
than no tests at all, but not as accurate as more extensive screening tools. Id. at 1103.
32. See supranotes 25-28 and accompanying text (setting forth the purpose and principal requirements
of the Patient Self-Determination Act).
33. See Ellen H. Elpern et al., A PreliminaryInvestigation of Opinionsand Behaviors RegardingAdvance
Directivesfor Medical Care, 2 AM. . CRITICAL CARE 161, 164 (1993) (estimating that fewer than half of all
patients executing advance directives have informed their physicians of their decisions); Jaya Virmani et al.,
Relationship of Advance Directives to Physician-PatientCommunication, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 909
(1994) (study finding little evidence that directives lead to improved communication between doctors and patients
about end of life treatment).
34. See GAO REPORT, supranote 14, at 13 (describing a study which found that only about one-third of
residents' advance directives were successfully delivered to the hospital and incorporated into the hospital record);
R. Sean Morrison et al., The Inaccessibilityof Advance Directives on Transferfrom Ambulatory to Acute Care
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Even if the facility is aware of the directive, other factors may lead to the
directive not being honored. Some health care providers treat elderly people in a
paternalistic manner, frequently resulting in a resident's wishes being superseded
by another course of action thought "better" for the resident.35 Also, the facility may
have a policy that is directly contrary to the wishes of the resident. Knowledge of
this policy may be imputed to the resident, making it more difficult to enforce the
resident's contrary directive.36 Additionally, family members may disagree with the
resident's desires regarding life-prolonging procedures and thus contest the
resident's directive, threatening the facility with litigation or actually filing a
petition with the court to prevent enforcement of the directive. Despite the law's
emphasis on the honoring of a patient's wishes through such tenets as the doctrine
of substituted judgment,37 the resident may find that her wishes are thwarted no
matter how careful the prior planning. It is important that the medical profession not
let its perception of the patient's best interest crowd out the patient's right of selfdetermination. 6 One of the principal objectives of the 1999 California Health Care
Decisions Law is to reinforce the honoring of advance directives by making it easier
for residents to make their wishes known and by taking steps that increase the
likelihood that those wishes will be honored.
III. CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE DECISIONS LAW

The California Health Care Decisions Law,39 which becomes operative on July
1, 2000,40 recasts California law on the making of advance directives. The new law,

Settings, 274 JAMA 478 (1995) (finding that only 26% of patients who had previously executed advance

directives had their directives recognized following their hospitalizations).
35. See Marion Danis et al.,A ProspectiveStudy ofAdvanceDirectivesforLfe.SustaningCare,324 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 882, 887 ("IThe data suggest that in caring for incapacitated patients, physicians balance respect
for autonomy with other competing ethical principles in order to make what they believe are the wisest
decisions.").
36. See generallyIn reJobes, 529 A.2d 434,450 (NJ. 1987) (deciding that where a facility did not inform
patient's family about its policy toward artificial feeding until the family requested that feeding be withdrawn,
the facili.ty could not avoid honoring family's request by discharging patient).

37. The court in Superintendentof Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977),
described the doctrine of substituted judgment as follows:

We believe... [the surrogate decision maker] should have attempted (as they did) to ascertain the
incompetent person's actual interests and preferences. In short, the decision in cases such as this should
be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into
account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would
necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent person.
Id. at 431.
38. See TOML BEAUCHAMP&JAMESF. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OFBIOMEDICAL ETHICS 271-91 (4th cd.
1994) (discussing the conflict between beneficence and autonomy).

39. 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 658, § 39 (codified at CAL PROD. CODE §§ 4600.4805 (West Supp. 2000)).
40. Id.§43.
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which was drafted by the California Law Revision Commission,4 t replaces, with a
the making of living
single statute, the formerly separate provisions governing
42 and durable powers of attorney for health care. 43
wills
A. Uniform Health-CareDecisionsAct
The California law is a substantial adoption of the Uniform Health-Care

Decisions Act, which was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1993." California is the sixth state to enact the Uniform

Act. 45 The purpose of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, similar to the new
California law, is to facilitate and encourage the making of advance directives."

The California Health Care Decisions Law incorporates most, but not all, of the
provisions of the Uniform Act; the California law addresses only advance directives
while the Uniform Act also covers health care decision making by family and close

friends, who are authorized to act on a patient's behalf if no conservator or agent
has been appointed or is reasonably available.47 While health care decision making

by family and close friends was included in the California bill as originally
introduced, these provisions were deleted by amendment in order to assure
enactment.48

41. For the official report, including the proposed bill, comments, and background memorandum, see
Health Care Decisionsfor Adults Without Decisionmaking Capacity,29 CAL L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS
(1999) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
42. The living will provisions were codified at CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp.
1999).
43. The power of attorney provisions were codified at CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4000-4947 (West Supp. 1999).
The provisions directed exclusively at health care were codified at §§ 4600-4806.
44. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS AcT, 9 U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 1999).
45. See also DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2517 (1998) (enacted in 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
327E-1 to -16 (Michie 1999) (enacted in 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to -817 (West 1998 &
Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-201 to -229 (Supp. 1999) (enacted in 1998); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (Michie 1996) (enacted in 1995).
46. UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS AcT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 309 (Supp. 1999). For analyses of
the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, see generally David M. English, The Health-CareDecisions Act
Represents a MajorAdvance, TR. & EST., May 1994, at 32; David M. English & Alan Meisel, Uniform HealthCare DecisionsAct Gives New Guidance, 21 EST. PLAN. 355 (1994); Charles P. Sabatino, The New Uniform
Health Care DecisionsAct: Paving a Health CareDecisions Superhighway, 53 MD. L. REV. 1238 (1994).
47. For a cross-reference table, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 243. Other sections of the
Uniform Act not enacted in California include Section 6 on health care decision making by conservators, and
Section 14 on judicial proceedings. The new Health Care Decisions Law carries forward California's existing
provisions on judicial proceedings. See CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4900-4947 (West Supp. 2000). For the application
of the standard for making decisions to decisions by conservators, see infra note 74 and accompanying text.
48. For the proposed provisions, which would have been codified at California Probate Code Sections 47 10
to 4716, see COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 41, at 111-17. The provisions were deleted because of objections

by the staff of the California Assembly Judiciary Committee, which described them as "controversial." See Cal.
L. Revision Comm'n, Minutes of Meeting ofJune 24-25, at 13-14; see also Cal. L. Revision Comm'n, Staff Mem.
99-38 (discussing amendments made to the bill).
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An issue not addressed in the Uniform Act is the problem of "friendless"
patients; individuals who have no family or anyone else available to act on their
behalf. California is one of the few states to have legislated on this subject, although
not in a comprehensive way. California Probate Code section 3200 creates ajudicial
procedure allowing the court to direct the health care to be provided to incapacitated
individuals not under conservatorship.49 Also, for residents of nursing homes,
nonintrusive and routine medical decisions for residents whom a physician
determines lacks capacity may be made by an interdisciplinary team, which may
include, where practical, a representative of the patient. 50 There remains a need,
both in California and elsewhere, for an expanded procedure that would allow not
only routine but also critical health care decisions to be made for friendless patients
outside of court but with appropriate safeguards. 5' Further, for individuals who do
have family or friends, California needs to join the substantial majority of states
that recognize the right of family (and, in a number of states, close friends) to make
52
health care decisions for patients who have failed to make advance directives.
B. Advance Health Care Directives Under the New Law
The California Health Care Decisions Law validates the right of an adult to give
an "advance health care directive" regarding the health care to be provided should
the adult later lack capacity to make health care decisions. Advance health care
directives come in two forms: an "individual health care instruction" or "individual

49. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 3200-3211 (West Supp. 2000). The Health Care Decisions Law leaves the
section 3200 procedure unchanged except for conforming amendments.
50. For the required procedure, see CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8 (West Supp. 2000).
51. The Commission proposal, as originally introduced, would have expanded existing law to allow any

health care facility to designate an interdisciplinary team to make any health care decision for patients in facilities,
including decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, whether the patient was in a nursing home
or hospital. Unlike the procedure authorized in California Health and Safety Code section 1418.8, the
Commission's proposal mandated the appointment of a patient or community representative to the
interdisciplinary team. For the proposal, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 118-23. The proposal was

deleted from the bill when it became obvious that it had no chance of enactment. See Cal. L. Revision Comm'n,
Minutes of Meeting of Apr. 8,1999, at 9-10.

The Commission proposal is subject to criticism because it failed to include a method for independent
decision making or review. See David A. Lash & Eric M. Carlson, Treatment by Committee Will Ignore
ConstitutionalRights of Elders, S.F. DAILY J.,
Apr. 15, 1999, at 4. However, the authors' suggestion that the

section 3200 proceeding is the appropriate means for handling the problem of the friendless patient is unrealistic.
The courts are ill equipped to resolve these issues as a matter of routine, a view which was expressed by the

California Court of Appeals itself in upholding the constitutionality of California Health & Safety Code section
1418.8, upon which the Commission proposal was based. Rains v. Belshe, 32 Cal. App. 4th 157, 180-81, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 185, 198 (1995); see also CAL PROB. CODE § 4650(c) (West Supp. 2000) ("In the absence of a
controversy, a court is normally not the proper forum in which to make health care decisions, including decisions

regarding life-sustaining treatment.").
52.

For a list of the statutory provisions, see MEISEL, supranote 3, § 14.10.
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instruction, ' 5 which replaces the "natural directive" or living will of former law;
and a "power of attorney for health care,"'' which is identical in function to the

durable power of attorney for health care of former law.
Under the new California law, an individual health care instruction can relate

to any aspect of health care. Unlike the former Natural Death Act, 55 the new law
does not attempt to define and restrict application of the statute to individuals

determined to be in a "terminal" or "permanently unconscious" condition,56 terms
which provide an appearance of precision where none is possible.57 Under the new
law, an individual instruction, and the authority which may be granted to an agent

under a power of attorney for health care, may extend to any "health care decision,"
a term that is expansively defined.58

Certain sensitive procedures are not covered by the new law, however. Subjects
still controlled by other laws include: commitment to a mental health treatment
facility; convulsive treatment; psychosurgery; sterilization; and abortion. 59The new

law also excludes from its scope the subject of physician-assisted suicide. 6' Finally,
while an advance directive may state the patient's wishes on DNR orders,

California retains the requirement that such an order may be entered only by a
physician. 61
C. Oral Instructionsand Designations

In addition to unifying the law on advance directives, the law adds some new
features. Although long-recognized in the case law, the new law for the first time
gives statutory recognition to a patient's oral instructions. 62 The new law also grants

53.

For the definition of "individual health care instruction" and "individual instruction," see CAL PROB.

CODE § 4623 (West Supp. 2000).

54. For the definition of "power of attorney for health care," see id § 4629 (West Supp. 2000).
55. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1999).
56. Id.§ 7186 (West 1999).
57. See English, supra note 46, at 35:
The drafters of the Uniform Act concluded that the attempts to statutorily prescribe the circumstances
when life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn unduly restrict, are difficult to apply in
a clinical setting, and provide an appearance of precision where none is possible.
Id.
58. For the definition of a "health care decision," see CAL PROB. CODE § 4617 (West Supp. 2000).
59. See id. § 4652 (Health Care Decisions Law does not authorize consent to any of the listed procedures);
id. § 4722 (power of attorney may not authorize attorney-in-fact to consent to any of listed procedures).
60. Id.§ 4653.
61. See id.§§ 4780-4786, which continue former California Probate Code section 4753 without substantive
change.
62. See id.§ 4670, which is drawn from section 2(a) of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act. The
drafters of the Uniform Act in turn picked up the idea from the 1992 Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983) and
1993 Maryland (MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(d)) statutes. See English, supra note 46., at 35-36. The
validation of oral directives does not create new law. Oral directives have long been enforced by the courts. For
a discussion of the case law on oral directives, see MEISEL, supranote 3, § 10.16 (2d ed. 1995).
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statutory confirmation to a patient's oral designation of a person to make health
care decisions on the patient's behalf,63 a practice not recognized in the case law but
encountered with some frequency by health care providers. The orally designated
surrogate is similar to, but does not quite have the status of, an agent appointed
under a written power of attorney for health care. For example, unlike the
appointment of an agent, which normally will continue for the principal's lifetime
unless revoked, an oral designation of a surrogate is effective only during the course
of treatment, illness, or stay in the health care institution.6 The power to orally
designate a surrogate should be particularly useful for couples in cohabiting
relationships who have neglected to sign written advance directives and are
concerned that their health care providers will automatically turn to their families
to make life-altering decisions instead of relying on their companions to make the
choice. While a formal power of attorney for health care is much to be preferred,
the oral surrogacy provision recognizes that for many patients, orally telling their
physicians whom they want to decide their fate is the most they are willing or able
to do.
D. Enforcement Provisions
The new law contains several provisions designed to enhance the enforcement
of advance directives. For the first time the law requires that a health care provider
actually honor the patient's advance directive, as well as comply with the decisions
made by an agent or orally designated surrogate. 65 This provision, if actually
enforced, will do more than any other to effectuate a patient's right to selfdetermination. A right to self-determination is of little benefit if there is no effective
way to enforce the right.
Not all provisions of an advance directive, or decisions of an agent or surrogate,
are enforceable, however. Under the new law, a provider may decline to honor a
directive or decision for "reasons of conscience."' For a health care institution,
such a declination must be based on a formal policy of the institution which was
timely communicated to the resident or person authorized to act on the resident's
behalf. 67 Early communication will help to avoid those unfortunate situations in
which the facility, upon being told of a decision to withdraw or withhold treatment,
informs the resident and resident's family of its policy well after the date that a

63. See CAL PROB. CODE § 4711 (West Supp. 2000), which is drawn from section 5(b) of the Uniform
Health-Care Decisions Act. The drafters of the Uniform Act derived the idea from the Maryland (MD. HEALTH-

GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(d)) statute. See English, supra note 46, at 36-38.
64. This limitation on the authority of a designated surrogate is not found in the Uniform Act but is a useful
addition, and is based on the assumption that most oral designations are not intended to be permanent in nature.
65. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4733 (West Supp. 2000).

66. Id. § 4734(a).
67. Id. § 4734(b).
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transfer to another facility could be arranged.6 Any health care provider, whether
an individual or an institution, may also decline a directive or decision if it requires
the provision of futile treatment, which is defined as care that would be "medically
ineffective," 69 or care contrary to generally accepted health care standards.70
E. StandardForms: Aspects, New and Old
The new law includes a statutory form.7 t Unlike former law, which provided
separate forms for living wills and durable powers of attorney for health care, the
new form combines both topics. As under former law, use of the statutory form is
entirely optional. An individual choosing the form may complete it in whole or in
part, and may modify any of its provisions. The form provides for the designation
of an agent and two alternate agents, the nomination of the agent as conservator of
the person if conservatorship becomes necessary, and the listing of any individual
instructions, to be binding on the agent and anyone else who might be called upon
to make health care decisions on the individual's behalf. With respect to the subject
of life-sustaining treatment, the form includes the alternatives most often selected,
but does not limit the individual to only those choices. The form is designed to
include all aspects of the type of advance directive signed by a well-advised client.
The dilemma is that some individuals are overwhelmed by anything other than the
shortest and most easily stated language.72 Designing a truly universal form is
probably impossible.
E The Decision-Maker'sStandard:A Patient-SensitiveApproach
The new law codifies the standard for making decisions. The decision maker
must comply with the individual patient's health care instructions and other express
wishes, to the extent known, whether written or oral. Otherwise, the health care
decision must be made in accordance with the patient's best interests as determined
in light of the patient's personal values, to the extent these values are known.7 3 The

68. For the case law on whether a facility must honor a request that is contrary to a stated policy, see
MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.23 (2d ed. 1995).
69. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4735 (West Supp. 2000).
70. Id.
71. d. §4701.
72. For a study of the consent form in use by the Veterans Administration, see supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
73. This standard codifies but makes more explicit the test stated in Barberv. SuperiorCourt, 147 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983):
[A]ny surrogate, court appointed or otherwise, ought to be guided in his or her decisions first by his
knowledge of the patient's own desires and feelings to the extent that they were expressed before the
patient became incompetent. ...If it is not possible to ascertain the choice the patient would have
made, the surrogate ought to be guided in his decision by the patient's best interest.
Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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standard for making decisions applies not only to agents and orally designated
surrogates, but also to conservators and anyone else who may be acting as the
patient's surrogate, 74 including the patient's family and close friends. The result is
that while the new law does not state when and which family members and close

friends are empowered to make health care decisions on a patient's behalf,
whenever they do assume this authority, they will be subject to a specified standard
of care.
G. Failureto Simplify the Witnessing Requirements

While progressive in many important ways, the new law fails to make one
forward stride. The bill as originally introduced tracked the execution requirements
of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, which keeps execution requirements for
an advance directive to an absolute minimum.75 While a place for witnesses is
provided in the Uniform Act's form, witnessing is not required.76 The drafters of the
Uniform Act concluded that the detailed execution requirements in many states
have done little to deter fraud or overreaching." While one can argue that requiring
more formality protects against forgery and prevents at least some undue influence,

the execution requirements of the former law, which are easily the most
complicated and confusing in the country, are overkill. 78 Nevertheless, to eliminate

the new law carries forward
a source of controversy and to assure the bill's passage,
79
the execution requirements of the former law.

74. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2355 (conservators), 4684 (agents), 4714 (surrogates) (West Supp. 2000).
75. The sole execution requirements under the Uniform Act are that a power of attorney for health care
must be in writing and be signed by the principal. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(b), 9 U.L.A. 315
(Supp. 1999).
76. Id. § 4,9 U.L.A. 318 (Supp. 1999).
77. See English, supranote 46, at 35:
The drafters of the Uniform Act concluded that the cumbersome execution requirements found under
many state statutes have done little to deter fraud or overreaching. Rather, their primary effect is to
deter the making of advance directives and invalidate defectively executed directives that otherwise
would be reliable indicators of the individual's intent.
Id
78. See English, supra note 27, at 368-76 (analyzing the execution requirements for a durable power of
attorney for health care in California and elsewhere).
79. CAL PROB. CODE §§ 4673-4675 (West Supp. 2000). The attempt to eliminate execution requirements
has been the least successful aspect of the Uniform Act. Of the six states which have adopted the Uniform Act,
only New Mexico has followed the Act on this point without change. For New Mexico's execution requirements,
see N.M.STAT.ANN. § 24-7A-2 (Michie 1996). Delaware requires two witnesses forboth an individual instruction
and power of attorney for health care. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(b) (Supp. 1998). Hawaii, Maine, and
Mississippi validate oral instructions but impose additional execution requirements for powers of attorney for
health care; Hawaii and Maine require witnessing, Mississippi allows either witnessing or acknowledgment. HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 327E-3 (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-802(b) (West 1998); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-205 (Supp. 1999).
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H. Provisionsof Special Importancefor Nursing Homes
The new California Health Care Decisions Law contains numerous provisions
of particular relevance to residents of nursing homes. While a significant portion
of nursing home residents lack capacity to make their own health care decisions,
this conclusion should not be too readily assumed in individual cases. For this
reason, the new law provides that all adult individuals are presumed capable of
making their own health care decisions.80 Also, because lack of capacity is a less
than precisely determinable condition, it is inappropriate for a patient to be placed
totally "out of the loop" as soon as the threshold between capacity and incapacity
has supposedly been crossed. To provide the resident with the peace of mind that
can come from being kept informed, the new law requires that the health care
provider, whenever possible, communicate to the resident the health care decision
being made and the identity of the person making the decision.8 ' Keeping the
resident informed also allows the resident to communicate the resident's wishes.
Lack of capacity does not imply a total inability to communicate; helpful input is
often still possible.
To protect against overreaching by the facility, the new law also prohibits an
owner, operator, or employee of a facility at which the resident is receiving care
from acting as the resident's agent.82 Owners, operators, or employees who are
related to the resident are exempt from this prohibition, however.8 3 In addition, to
assure that the advance directive executed by the nursing home resident is truly the
resident's independent choice, the new law also carries forward the provision that
a patient advocate or ombudsman designated by the Department of Aging must
witness the directive.84
IV. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE LEGISLATION

The new California Health Care Decisions Law has many notable features.
Through its consistent philosophy of encouraging the making of and enforcement
of advance directives, the new law, if properly implemented, will have a major
impact on the making of health care decisions for nursing home residents. Ideally,
every nursing home resident who wants an advance directive will make one prior
to loss of capacity, and health care providers, in providing care, will be guided by
the provisions of the directive itself or by the person whom the directive appoints.

80. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4657 (West Supp. 2000). The presumption of capacity also applies to the making
and revoking of an advance health care directive, and to the designation and disqualification of a surrogate. Id.

81. Id. § 4730.
82. Id. § 4659(a).
83. Id. § 4659(b)(1).

84. Id. § 4673.
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But there are limits to what can be accomplished with legislation. No legislation
can by itself overcome the hesitancy of individuals to make advance directives.
Legislation alone cannot overcome the failure of physicians to discuss with their
patients the subject of life-sustaining treatment, particularly in this era of
impersonal managed care and physicians practicing medicine on a time clock. Nor
will the new law alone induce individuals to discuss these issues with their families.
If no matter how heroic the selling efforts only a small percentage of individuals
will execute advance directives, then the enactment of even excellent advance
directives legislation will do only marginal good. The focus should now shift
elsewhere-to those topics addressed in the California Health Care Decisions Law
as originally introduced, but which were excised from the bill as the legislation
moved forward. The need remains for an effective system of health care decision
making for the majority of Californians who will never make advance directives-a
system that will protect rights while simultaneously assuring that the necessary
decisions are made.
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